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porate retail outlet could provide. Additionally the convenience of
location could save unnecessary travel expense.
The practice of pharmacy has long been considered a profession"3
closely linked to public health. The same public policy impliedly
prevails over this practice. In Oklahoma, though, the extent of regula-
tion has been quite different.34 For example, mercantile corporations
can employ registered pharmacists. Pharmacists are allowed to collo-
cate in buildings with medical doctors. Additionally, no total ban exists
prohibiting retail pharmaceutical advertising. The public health ap-
pears unaffected by the "commercialism" in this profession.
The challenges to the statutes in this area have generally been a
matter of construction, with few reversals of the legislative power to
enact such measures. A statutory proximity requirement will always
be difficult to elucidate, and therefore, consideration should be given
to the necessity of this regulation in light of its repeated invalidations.
A review should be made of the basis for prohibiting corporate involve-
ment in this field. These debatable questions, as to the reasonable-
ness, wisdom and propriety of such legislation, remain the duty and
responsibility of the lawmaking body. The changing times and modem
awareness of today's society require a fuller evaluation of these restric-
tions by the Oklahoma State Legislature.
George P. Roberts, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A SUFFICIENT NExUs TEST FOR A FIND-
ING OF STATE ACTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION. Junior Cham-
ber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, 495
F.2d 883 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 505 (1974).
In the recent case of Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester,
Inc. v. United States Jaycees,' the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit encountered the persistent constitutional question of what consti-
33. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 353.2 (1971).
34. OKLA. STAT. tit 59, § 353 (1971).
1. 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 . Ct. 505 (1974).
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tutes state action. The question was posed in the context of a sex dis-
crimination case brought under title 42, section 1983 of the United
States Code2 in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Oklahoma. The bylaws of the United States Jaycees limited
chapter membership to males. Accordingly when the Rochester Chap-
ter permitted women the privilege of chapter membership, that chapter
was subjected to expulsion from the United States Jaycees. In the
district court, plaintiffs alleged that the existence of state action was
evidenced by the tax benefits and government funds given to the
United States Jaycees. The district court rejected plaintiffs' conten-
tion and dismissed the action for failure to present a substantial fed-
eral question.3 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, preliminarily, accepted
the proposition that discrimination based on sex is unconstitutional if
state action is demonstrated. 4  The court then proceeded to ascertain
whether there was a sufficient showing of state action to support a sec-
tion 1983 cause of action. The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's dismissal, holding that state involvement was insufficient unless
"the alleged unconstitutional conduct relate[s] specifically to govern-
mental action."5
The Jaycees opinion articulated a restricted view of what consti-
tutes state action. In formulating this approach the court turned to prior
Tenth Circuit decisions,6 which appeared to require a direct nexus be-
tween the government involvement and the complained of activity.
The Tenth Circuit also utilized a composite standard drawn from two
United States Supreme Court decisions. 7 The Supreme Court in
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis8 found that the mere presence of a liquor
license did not in and of itself constitute state action. The Moose
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
3. Junior Chamber of Commerce of Rochester, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, No.
73-C-66 (N.D. Okla., June 26, 1973).
4. 495 F.2d at 885. The court relied upon Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) as support for this holding.
5. Id. at 888.
6. Ward v. St. Anthony's Hospital, 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973) (a small per-
centage of governmental funding was insufficient to constitute state action since the
state was not shown to have played any part in the alleged civil rights deprivation);
Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969) (unrelated and collateral discrimina-
tory policies of private organizations do not furnish the state action necessary to support
a civil rights suit).
7. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Waltz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
S. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The state scheme of granting liquor licenses was not suf-
ficient to bring the private club's restriction of membership and guest privileges to non-
blacks within the scope of state action.
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Lodge decision was interpreted by the Tenth Circuit court as articu-
lating a "sufficient nexus ' test for determining state action. The
nexus test had also been utilized in a Supreme Court case involving
the question of state establishment of religion, Waltz v. Tax Commis-
sion."0 The Jaycees opinion analogized the test utilized for determin-
ing whether state assistance constitutes state action to the one used to
determine whether state assistance constitutes the establishment of re-
ligion;" both require the court to measure the nature and quantitative
significance of the state's support of private institutions. The Jaycees
court's interpretation of Moose Lodge and prior Tenth Circuit deci-
sions, coupled with the analogous establishment of religion test gleaned
from Waltz, apparently supports the restrictive interpretation that state
action requires "a sufficient nexus between the discrimination and the
alleged state action."' 2
The plaintiff-appellants proposed an alternative conceptual
scheme and in effect argued that the "state must . . . refrain from
dealing with discriminators regardless of whether the discrimination is
related to the alleged state action."' 3 This position carries with it the
apparent support of the 1973 Supreme Court decision Norwood v. Har-
rison14 which involved state assistance to private schools in the form
of text book grants. The state assistance was held to be constitutionally
impermissible due to the schools' discriminatory admissions policies.
The Norwood decision did not appear to require any nexus between
the text book aid and the challenged admissions policies.
More apparent support for the position of the plaintiff-appellants
can be found in earlier Supreme Court decisions, most notably Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority.' The Burton case involved a pri-
vate restaurant located in a public garage facility. When the dis-
criminatory service policies of the restaurant were challenged as state
9. 495 F.2d at 888.
10. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court held that a New York state statute exempting
religious organizations from property taxation did not itself establish, sponsor or support
religion in violation of the first amendment.
11. 495 F.2d at 888.
12. Id. (emphasis in original); accord, Junior Chamber of Commerce of Kansas
City v. Missouri State Junior Chamber of Commerce, 508 F.2d 1031, 1033 (8th Cir.
1975). Contra, New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 377 F.
Supp. 481, 489 n.34 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
13. 495 F.2d at 887.
14. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
15. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Although the laycee opinion cites the Burton opinion
as support, the holding of Burton appears to be more clearly aligned with the petitioners'
proposed state action test.
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action, the Supreme Court articulated a test of "sifting facts and weigh-
ing circumstances"'16 for determining the presence of state action. The
landlord-tenant relationship coupled with the public nature of the fa-
cility was held to constitute state action in the Burton opinion.
The tenor and emphasis of Burton and Norwood appears to be
that discrimination and state action are two independent elements of
a section 1983 cause of action, and that no causal relationship or nexus
between state action and the discrimination need be shown. The Nor-
wood schools were discriminatory with or without the text book sup-
port. The restaurant involved in the Burton case could have refused
service to blacks in a privately owned building. However, the substan-
tial quantitative involvement by the state in both Burton and Norwood
transformed the actions of the otherwise private entities into state ac-
tion.
The position postulated by the plaintiff-appellants appears to be
more in line with past Supreme Court decisions involving state action.
Moose Lodge may be distinguished from the Jaycees case, in that, in
Moose Lodge the totality of the state contact with the private club was
a liquor license; whereas in Jaycees, the state had granted significant
financial assistance to the organization's programs. The use of Waltz
by analogy appears to be unnecessary since there is adequate case law
in point with the Jaycees case. The Supreme Court cases Burton and
Norton appear to be consistent with the plaintiff-appellants position as
opposed to the nexus approach adopted in the Jaycees opinion.
In the recent case of Jackson v. Statler Foundation,'17 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was faced with a somewhat analo-
gous fact pattern to the Jaycees case. In Jackson, the racially discrimi-
natory practices of a private foundation were challenged as state action
due to the charitable tax exemptions given to the foundation. The Sec-
ond Circuit examined a line of Supreme Court decisions 18 and con-
cluded that state action is determined by the extent and nature of the
state involvement in the institutions.'9 The Jackson opinion did not
16. 365 U.S. at 722.
17. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974). Tax advantages given to an otherwise private
foundation coupled with the presence of state officials on the foundation's governing
body established state action.
18. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
19. 496 F.2d at 629. The opinion submitted five factors which could be examined
to determine the presence of state action. The factors included: (1) the degree to
which the "private" college or foundation is dependent on governmental aid; (2) the
extent and intrusiveness of the governmental regulatory scheme; (3) whether that
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